News Desk
Ecologists and environmentalists have been closely studying the deadly collapse of a bridge in Sichuan a few days ago. The incident has raised serious doubts about China’s ability to execute ambitious infrastructure projects responsibly. Experts argue that the collapse reflects deeper policy and systemic failures, pointing directly to China’s ruling party for prioritizing speed, visual grandeur, and propaganda over engineering quality and ecological stability.
Experts noted that China, which has built the world’s largest expressway network and over 5.4 million km of highways by 2023, cannot dismiss this collapse as a minor engineering mishap. Instead, it highlights fundamental structural issues in planning, design, risk management, and regulatory oversight. The decision to construct a major bridge in a geologically unstable corridor itself demonstrates the political and systemic pressures that shape large infrastructure projects.
China’s infrastructure expansion has been staggering. Highway length grew from about 80,700 km in 1949 to more than 5.43 million km in 2023, while expressways expanded from roughly 65,000 km in 2009 to around 177,000 km by 2022. Experts argue that the Communist Party’s governance style heavily rewards speed and scale. Projects completed quickly and showcased on state media serve as career capital for local officials and state-owned enterprises. In this model, risks are often underpriced, and long-term safety or maintenance concerns become secondary to political gains.
The Hongqi Bridge, standing 172 metres tall and stretching 758 metres, exemplifies this high-risk, high-pressure environment. Chinese state media quoted experts acknowledging the instability of the region and noting that slope management and landslide control should have been fundamental to the bridge’s design—not an afterthought. The collapse of the approach and roadbed, while the main span remained intact, indicates that the interface between natural terrain and engineered structures was the most vulnerable point. This is precisely where rigorous geotechnical assessment is critical.
However, geological risk assessment and long-term slope stability were inadequately internalised within China’s design, monitoring, and approval culture. Academic reviews of bridge failures across China show recurring problems: weak enforcement of standards, insufficient maintenance, and inadequate post-opening inspections. Though authorities detected issues early enough to close the Hongqi Bridge before the collapse, they failed to identify deeper slope-related risks throughout years of planning and construction—reflecting broader systemic oversight failures.
Landslide experts analysed pre-construction satellite images and videos of the collapse. The surrounding region showed signs of paleo-landslides, fractured rock masses, and loose deposits within steep, active topography. Water impoundment, which began on 1 May 2025, likely increased groundwater pressure. Landslides during first impoundment are common, as seen in the Three Gorges project. Video evidence suggested the initial failure occurred just above road level, where slopes were excavated for the road platform. The collapse then propagated both upslope and downslope. Experts believe a combination of rising groundwater, geological instability, and engineering shortcomings—particularly in slope cutting—contributed to the disaster.
The Hongqi Bridge project formed part of a larger infrastructure investment package costing about $399 million, including adjacent highway works. Local governments and state-owned enterprises were under intense pressure to complete projects on schedule to unlock funding, media publicity, and promotions. The attention of the Chinese government shifted to new projects after the inaugural ceremony, leaving long-term monitoring under-emphasized.
This pattern is not new. The Yangmingtan Bridge in Harbin suffered a ramp collapse in 2012, killing three people, barely a year after opening. Investigations highlighted rushed construction, design flaws, and corruption—echoing the systemic issues seen in the Hongqi case.
Regulatory fragmentation and limited independence further weaken China’s infrastructure governance. Projects are often controlled by networks of state-owned engineering companies, provincial agencies, and local governments. Design, construction, approval, and inspection frequently occur within the same political ecosystem, blurring oversight. Local governments may both commission and approve projects, creating inherent conflicts of interest. Engineers are discouraged from whistle-blowing in an environment that prioritises political harmony and the projection of success.
For global investors, the Hongqi Bridge collapse is a stark reminder of the multilayered risks embedded in infrastructure-heavy emerging markets. Geological hazards, political imperatives, and operational weaknesses often intersect, increasing uncertainty. A Meyka report noted that the collapse has intensified demands for transparency and stricter safety protocols in China, especially in western provinces where terrain is inherently unstable. Although authorities have pledged investigations, the absence of confirmed construction flaws has left investors in a state of ambiguity. Delays, cost overruns, and quality-control failures are already common across major emerging markets, and the Hongqi incident reinforces concerns about governance and risk assessment.
The collapse is also a warning for the international community. While the immediate ecological and financial impacts may appear limited, the disaster underscores the need for stronger global scrutiny of China’s large-scale projects undertaken in geologically unstable areas due to limited transparency. China has a tendency to withhold information from its citizens and the world further complicates accountability. The international community must pressure China to release complete investigation findings and to adopt safer, more sustainable infrastructure practices.
