News Desk
China’s high-speed railway network, a sprawling 30,000-mile marvel, stands as a symbol of the country’s rapid modernization. Launched under Xi Jinping’s ambitious vision in 2013, it has grown into one of the largest public works projects in history, dwarfing the U.S.’s stalled efforts at similar infrastructure. For many Chinese, the sleek “Rejuvenation” trains embody national progress, connecting megacities like Beijing and Shanghai to far-flung regions. Yet, beneath the sheen of this achievement lies a growing financial strain, with mounting debts, underused routes, and a reliance on political ambition over economic pragmatism threatening its sustainability.
Recent reports paint a sobering picture. According to Chinese commentators citing a February 2025 National Audit Office report, the high-speed rail system incurred a staggering 100 billion yuan (roughly $14 billion) loss in the nine months ending December 2024. Though unconfirmed on the NAO’s official channels, the figure has sparked heated debate.
Critics argue that the rapid expansion into remote areas over the past two decades ignored long-term costs. Supporters, however, highlight the network’s social value, connecting less-developed regions to economic hubs and fostering mobility. Financial transparency remains elusive. China State Railway Group Co Ltd, which oversees the network, blends high-speed rail figures with those of older “green-skinned trains,” obscuring the system’s true fiscal health.
The Beijing-Shanghai High Speed Railway Co Ltd, a rare exception that reports to the Shanghai stock exchange, offers some insight. In 2024, it saw a 2.31% drop in passenger volume to 52.02 million but boosted net profit by 10.6% to 12.77 billion yuan ($1.78 billion), partly by sharing its tracks with other operators. Yet, this profitability is an outlier. Of China’s 45,000 kilometers of high-speed rail in 2023, only 2,300 kilometers—about 6%—turned a profit, confined to six coastal routes like Beijing-Shanghai and Guangzhou-Shenzhen. Even the lucrative Beijing-Shanghai line, with its 220.9 billion yuan investment, is projected to take two decades to break even.
The network’s financial woes are compounded by broader economic challenges. In 2024, China’s railway system carried 4.09 billion passengers, a 10.9% increase from the previous year, with China Railway’s revenue rising 3.1% to 1.28 trillion yuan and net profit climbing 17.6% to 3.88 billion yuan. But these figures mask a troubling trend: passengers are increasingly price-sensitive in a sluggish economy.
A Henan-based writer noted in February 2025 that many high-speed trains, especially on weekdays, ran nearly empty, while operating costs remained high. During the Spring Festival rush, millions of migrant workers opted for cheaper green-skinned trains, with fares like Zhengzhou-Wuhan costing 90 yuan compared to 270 yuan on high-speed rail.
To offset losses, China Railway raised fares on profitable routes by 20% in mid-2024, further pricing out lower-income travelers. The network’s overexpansion has led to stark inefficiencies. Since 2010, 20 high-speed rail stations—dubbed “ghost stations”—have been decommissioned in provinces like Anhui, Yunnan, Liaoning, and Jiangsu due to low passenger turnout.
A Hubei-based columnist tied this to the 2008 economic stimulus, which poured 4 trillion yuan into infrastructure, spurring local governments to build stations in poorly chosen, remote locations. A Hebei writer echoed this, noting that many projects lacked economic grounding and were driven by political goals rather than practical demand. As local governments cut transportation subsidies amid financial pressure, more underused stations face closure. China’s high-speed rail challenges extend beyond its borders, as seen in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
A 2025 Lowy Institute report highlighted that developing countries owe China $35 billion in debt repayments this year, with $22 billion from the world’s poorest nations. Much of this stems from BRI loans for infrastructure, including rail projects like Indonesia’s Whoosh, a $7.3 billion Jakarta-Bandung line plagued by delays and cost overruns before its 2023 launch. Indonesia now eyes an extension to Surabaya, but analysts warn of regulatory hurdles and mounting debt to China, reflecting the broader risks of Beijing’s global infrastructure push.
In response to domestic financial strain, the Chinese government advised timetable revisions, private investment, and tech-driven efficiencies in September 2024. Reducing train frequency and fares in remote areas brought marginal relief by January 2025, but profitability remains elusive.
Comparisons to Japan’s pricier Tokyo-Osaka line (1,200 yuan versus Beijing-Shanghai’s 553 yuan) underscore doubts about short-term profitability. Some analysts argue that social value—connecting people and regions—should outweigh financial metrics, but the network’s 6.2 trillion yuan debt looms large.
Based on this comparison, some analysts expressed doubt over the profitability of China’s high-speed rail system in the near term. While various policy suggestions had surfaced, their practical implementation was considered challenging, making social value the more meaningful benchmark.
